Abstract: Arbitration as an investor-state dispute settlement mechanism has been utilized for a long time. Achmea ruling has constituted a turning point in EU investment arbitration as the Court of Justice of the EU ruled on the invalidity of the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism in intra-EU bilateral investment treaties. The judgment has affected not only bilateral investment treaties but also intra-EU disputes arising out of Energy Charter Treaty. In fact, Achmea judgment has affected the future progress of investment arbitration as a whole.
Keywords: Arbitration, bilateral investment treaty, Energy Charter Treaty, investment, legal autonomy.
Introduction
In 2018, the Court of Justice of the EU[1] has granted its ruling on Slowakische Republik v Achmea BV[2]and ruled for the first time that arbitration clauses contained in intra-EU bilateral investment treaties[3] are incompatible with EU law. It is regarded as a land-mark decision due to its effect on the future progress of investment arbitration.
Indeed, Achmea judgment, where CJEU ruled on the invalidity of intra-EU BITs, has affected the intra-EU disputes arising out of Energy Charter Treaty[4] – a multilateral trade and investment treaty governing the energy sector. Following Achmea, CJEU, together with its ruling on République de Moldavie v Komstroy LLC,[5] declared the invalidity of investor-state dispute settlement[6] mechanism under ECT between EU Member States[7]. Although Achmea ruling has been put forward before numerous arbitral tribunals to object jurisdiction, the cases have continued to be seen[8] until Green Power v Kingdom of Spain[9]case where the tribunal in question found that it does not have jurisdiction in an intra-EU conflict in connection with ECT.
After addressing the factual, procedural and legal background of the case and exploring the legal reasoning followed by the CJEU, a critical assessment will be made with particular focus on the effects of this landmark decision on the ECT. All of these examinations will reveal how Achmea case has affected and continue to affect the future direction of investment arbitration.
1. Factual Background
In 1993, Slovakia, as a successor state to Czech and Slovak Federative Republic[10], succeeded to the BIT concluded between the Netherlands and CSFR.[11] In 2004, Slovakia joined EU and opened its health insurance market to both national and EU operators providing services on private sickness insurance.[12] Achmea, part of a Dutch insurance group, established a Slovak subsidiary to offer such services.[13] In 2006, private sickness insurance liberalization was partially reversed by Slovakian government and in 2007, the government banned distribution of profits from such activities.[14] In 2011, Slovak Constitutional Court ruled that the ban was against the Constitution and in the same year, distribution of profits allowed once more by law.[15] Consequently, due to the legislative measures during a relevant period, Achmea claimed to have suffered financial losses.
2. Procedural and Legal Background
Firstly, the procedural background should be analysed. In 2008, Achmea brought an arbitration proceeding against Slovakia owing to the damages caused by the legislative measures.[16] The place of arbitration was determined as Frankfurt am Main and the applicable law was set up as German law.[17] Slovakia argued during the arbitration proceedings that the arbitral tribunal did not have jurisdiction as the Article 8(2) – which is related to the ISDS mechanism – was not compatible with EU law, however the arbitral tribunal did not accept the jurisdictional objection.[18] Therefore, the Arbitral Tribunal concluded that the arbitration clause set out in the Article 8(2) was enforceable. In 2012, the arbitral tribunal issued an order towards Slovakia to pay EUR 22.1 million.[19] Slovakia filed a case before Higher Regional Court in Frankfurt am Main and requested to set aside the award.[20] The objections raised by Slovakia were not accepted by the Higher Regional Court. After it dismissed the case, Slovakia submitted an appeal before the Federal Court of Justice.[21] In turn, the German Federal Court of Justice referred questions on the compatibility of the BIT’s arbitration clause with EU law to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling.
Secondly, the legal background should be addressed. Slovakia mainly argued that the ISDS mechanism in the Article 8 of the BIT is incompatible with the Articles 18, 267 and 344 of the Treating of the Functioning of the European Union[22].[23] Therefore, the case required the interpretation of the related provisions of EU law. Accordingly, as noted above, the Federal Court of Justice applied for a preliminary ruling since the CJEU did not rule before on this legal matter and numerous other intra-EU BITs involve provisions foreseeing arbitration as a ISDS mechanism.[24] Accordingly, the following questions were asked to the CJEU:[25]
“(1) Does Article 344 TFEU preclude the application of a provision in a bilateral investment protection agreement between Member States of the European Union (a so-called intra-EU BIT) under which an investor of a Contracting State, in the event of a dispute concerning investments in the other Contracting State, may bring proceedings against the latter State before an arbitral tribunal where the investment protection agreement was concluded before one of the Contracting States acceded to the European Union but the arbitral proceedings are not to be brought until after that date?
If Question 1 is to be answered in the negative:
(2) Does Article 267 TFEU preclude the application of such a provision?
If Questions 1 and 2 are to be answered in the negative:
(3) Does the first paragraph of Article 18 TFEU preclude the application of such a provision under them circumstances described in Question 1?”
3. Rationale Behind the Judgment
First of all, CJEU, by evaluating the first and second questions together, clarified that “the referring court essentially asks whether Articles 267 and 344 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding a provision in an international agreement concluded between Member States such as Article 8 of the BIT”.[26] Article 344 TFEU involves the commitment of MS “not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaties to any method of settlement other than those provided for therein”. In this context, CJEU made reference to the Opinion 2/13 where it ruled that accession of EU itself to the European Convention of Human Rights[27] is not compatible with EU law.[28] CJEU recalled that an international agreement cannot undermine EU legal autonomy.[29]
CJEU then moved on to analyse the place of arbitral tribunals within MS. According to CJEU, even if the arbitral tribunal is requested to examine whether there is any violation under the BIT, it may need to consider the domestic law of MS and related agreements between the MS.[30] In this case, the arbitral tribunal may need to interpret and apply EU law.[31] Therefore, CJEU noted that it is required to determine whether an arbitral tribunal can be considered as a MS court or tribunal within the scope of Article 267 TFEU.[32] Article 267 TFEU provides that court or tribunal of a MS may request for a preliminary ruling. In this connection, CJEU referred to the case numbered C-377/13[33] where court or tribunal of a MS status was derived from the fact that tribunal in question was part of the judicial system established under the Portuguese constitution.[34] CJEU concluded that the arbitral tribunal in the main proceeding cannot be considered as part of the legal systems of either Netherlands or Slovakia within the scope of Article 267 TFEU and therefore, cannot apply to CJEU for a preliminary ruling.[35] CJEU further evaluated that the Article 8 of the BIT undermines not only the principle of mutual trust among the MS but also the unique legal framework ensured by the Article 267 TFEU, making it incompatible with the sincere cooperation principle.[36] As a result, in CJEU’s view, the Article 8 of the BIT adversely affects EU legal autonomy.[37]
In consequence, CJEU decided that the “Articles 267 and 344 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding a provision in an international agreement concluded between Member States, such as Article 8 of the BIT”.[38] As the responses to the first and second questions are positive, CJEU did not answer the third question.[39]
4. Opinion of the Advocate General
Particular reference to the opinion of the Advocate General[40] is required as this opinion was completely different from the judgment of CJEU. AG has examined the second question before the first question because he evaluated that “an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Article 8 of the BIT is a court or tribunal within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU, common to two Member States…and is therefore permitted to request the Court to give a preliminary ruling”.[41] AG, by referring to previous case law, noted that the several factors including “whether the body is established by law, whether it is permanent, whether its jurisdiction is compulsory, whether its procedure is inter partes, whether it applied rules of law and whether it is independent” are taken into account to determine the existence of a “court or tribunal” within the context of the Article 267.[42] AG considered that these conditions do not exclude arbitral tribunals automatically.[43] In AG’s opinion, although CJEU has rejected to answer number of preliminary ruling questions received from arbitrators, it has also accepted such questions on case-by-case basis.[44] In this regard, AG referred to the cases numbered 109/88[45], C-377/13[46] and C-555/13[47]. According to AG’s view, since the arbitral tribunal established under the Article 8 of the BIT are “court or tribunals” within the scope of the Article 267 TFEU, recourse to arbitration cannot undermine autonomy of EU legal order.[48]
AG added that if CJEU considers the arbitral tribunal established under the Article 8 of the BIT are not “court or tribunals” within the scope of the Article 267 TFEU, the issue whether the Article 344 TFEU precludes the Article 8 of the BIT still needs to be clarified.[49] AG, by reference to the cases numbered C-459/03[50] and Opinion 2/13[51], noted that EU does not have party status under the BIT, therefore CJEU’s exclusive jurisdiction under the Article 344 TFEU is not affected.[52] The former case was related to the United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea and EU is party to it whereas the latter case was related to the EU’s accession to the ECHR.
Moreover, AG emphasized that the role of the arbitral tribunal is to determine the breaches of BIT and EU law constitutes only a relevant factor for tribunal’s assessment.[53] In this connection, AG referred to case numbered ARB/97/7,[54] in which the investor asserted that Spain failed to provide fair and equitable treatment and imposed additional costs for environmental impact assessment, but the tribunal found that Spain was simply enforcing EU law requirements.[55]
Furthermore, in the view of AG, the intra-EU BITs, particularly the one in question, provide unique rights and obligations that neither duplicate nor contradict EU law.[56] First of all, BITs address all state actions affecting foreign investors and cover situations beyond TEU and TFEU.[57] In the second place, certain BIT provisions, namely most-favored nation clause, umbrella cluse, sunset clause and ISDS mechanism, have no counterparts in EU law.[58] Thirdly, investment protection rules, namely full protection, fair and equitable treatment and prohibition on illegal expropriation, partially overlap with EU law, but remain compatible, promoting capital movement within the internal market.[59]
In addition, as per AG’s opinion, article 8 of the BIT, giving opportunity the Dutch and Slovak investors to apply ISDS mechanism does not undermine EU legal autonomy, even if such tribunals do not fall under the definition of Article 267 TFEU.[60] It is not possible to enforce an award without the involvement of the MS.[61] The national courts can refuse to recognize and enforce the award based on the Article 5 of the New York Convention owing to controversies with (European) public policy.[62] The EU judicial system remains effective even if a MS fails to challenge award’s incompatibility with EU law, as the Commission may take action under the Articles 258 and 260 TFEU against that MS.[63] Therefore, AG considers that EU legal autonomy is not undermined by the Article 8 of the BIT.[64] As a result, AG concluded that the Articles 18, 267 and 344 TFEU should be interpreted as not precluding the ISDS mechanism established under a BIT concluded between the MS.[65]
5. Critical Analysis
One year after the Opinion 2/15,[66] where CJEU ruled that investment dispute settlement section of the EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement falls under the shared competence and should be concluded as mixed agreements, CJEU granted Achmea decision. CJEU did not follow the AG’s opinion and found that the arbitration clause in the intra-EU BIT is against EU law. The ruling reinforces the autonomy of EU law which is the core principle of EU legal order. Through the exclusion of arbitral tribunals, CJEU ensures the uniformity in the interpretation and application of EU law as the arbitral tribunal may need to examine EU law to grant a decision and CJEU is the sole authority that is allowed to interpret EU law. The judgment particularly underscores the mutual trust among the MS. Achmea case results that investment disputes may be brought before national courts, not arbitral tribunals and preliminary ruling procedure may be initiated depending on the case upon the request of national courts.
The rationale built upon the autonomy of EU legal order and promotion of mutual trust may seem logical. Concerns have also been raised for a long-time regarding transparency, partiality and inconsistency of arbitral awards. However, Achmea ruling created significant uncertainty regarding the status of existing intra-EU BITs at that time. Indeed, Achmea ruling has not marked the conclusion of the intra-EU debate as it automatically neither terminates nor invalidates the ISDS provisions contained in the intra-EU BITs.[67] Under international law, intra-EU BITs remain valid until the MS terminate them, whereas under EU law, the principle of primacy requires MS to take all measures to address incompatibility.[68] Achmea ruling has constituted the beginning of the sequence of legal matters.
EU had actively encouraged the MS to terminate their intra-EU BITs and as a result, Agreement for the Termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties between the Member States of the European Union[69] has been adopted in 2020. But, the Termination Agreement has not covered the ECT. This is expressly stated in the preamble. Therefore, the question of excluding the ECT’s applicability to intra-EU disputes was deferred[70] for that time.
After Achmea case, in numerous arbitration proceedings, invalidity of intra-EU BITs has been asserted. However, the arbitral tribunals, in number of occasions, have continued to see the cases and have not accepted this jurisdiction challenge[71] until a relatively recent arbitral award noted below.
The Achmea case itself does not clarify the implications of the ruling for intra-EU disputes under the ECT. Therefore, to answer what were the impacts of this decision in the ECT further developments must be considered. Indeed, the effect of Achmea judgment has not been limited to the intra-EU BITs. Achmea case has influenced the future direction of ISDS mechanism, particularly the disputes arising out of ECT. In this accord, CJEU’s Komstroy ruling represents a crucial moment. CJEU, while deciding on Komstroy judgment, referred Achmea judgment and ruled invalidity of the ISDS provision in the ECT between the MS. Afterwards, in Green Power v Kingdom of Spain award, the arbitral tribunal has unanimously recognized the intra-EU jurisdictional objection in an ECT-based dispute for the first time.[72]
The impact of the Achmea and Komstroy judgments has contributed to a crisis of legitimacy of the ECT within the EU. Many MS – including France, Germany and Spain – at the time decided to abandon the ECT. Deficits of the modernization negotiations had indeed impact on such withdrawal intentions.[73] This “mass exit” process raised doubts about the long-term viability of the ECT as a global treaty, especially considering that EU states represented a significant part of its contracting parties.
Modernization of ECT had been on the agenda for a while and on the 3rd of December 2024, modernized ECT was finally adopted.[74] However, before than that, EU itself had also withdrawn from the ECT. According to the press release on the 27th of June 2024, the President of the Council, on behalf of the EU, notified the ECT depositary in writing of the EU’s withdrawal, which will take effect one year after receipt.[75] In respect of modernization process, on the 24th of June 2022, the Contracting Parties of the ECT had reached agreement in principle.[76] However, several doubts have been remained from the side of EU.[77] Due to insufficient MS support, the EU has not embraced the modernized version of the ECT, which was negotiated to align the ECT with the EU’s climate and energy goals and its investment protection framework.[78] This circumstance led the European Commission to propose withdrawal for the EU, Euratom and the MS from the unmodernised version of the ECT owing to the concerns about fossil fuel investment protection.[79] As noted above, the mass exit has finally resulted with the exit of the EU itself.
Moreover, the MS and the EU has adopted a “Declaration on the Legal Consequences of the Judgment of the Court of Justice in Komstroy and Common Understanding on the Non-applicability of Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty as a Basis for Intra-EU Arbitration Proceedings” on the 26th of June 2024 and declared that the Article 26 of the ECT “cannot and never could serve as a legal basis for intra-EU arbitration proceedings”.[80] The Article 26 regulates the ISDS mechanism under the ECT.
Achmea judgment has paved the way for modifying ISDS mechanism in general, but this process still remains incomplete. Creation of a multilateral investment court[81] has been discussed but not achieved yet. An attempt to create an investment court under Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement[82] has been made, however CETA has not entered into force yet. CJEU, in its Opinion 1/17,[83] considered that multilateral investment system under CETA is not against EU legal autonomy.
Conclusion
CJEU’s Achmea judgment on the incompatibility of arbitration clauses included in the BITs between MS is of major importance. Achmea ruling has been regarded as a land-mark decision due to its effect on the future progress of investment arbitration. It was the first step to prohibit the application of ISDS mechanism to intra-EU BITs and it further affected the intra-EU disputes arising out of ECT. Following Achmea, CJEU, together with its ruling on Komstroy, declared invalidity of intra-EU ISDS mechanism under ECT. It is clear that although the Achmea decision formally applied to intra-EU BITs, its implications have been quickly extended to the ECT. As final words, it is worth to mention that Achmea ruling has been put forward before numerous arbitral tribunals to object jurisdiction, the cases have continued to be seen until the Green Powers v Kingdom of Spain case where the tribunal in question found that it does not have jurisdiction in an intra-EU conflict in connection with ECT. “Modernization” of the ECT had been on the agenda for a while. Nevertheless, doubts remained from the side of EU. This circumstance led to the withdrawals from the ECT. EU has also actively engaged for the establishment of investment court system, however this process remains incomplete. It is clear that all of these series of cases affected and continue to affect future direction of ISDS mechanism.
[1] Hereinafter will be referred as “CJEU”.
[2] See C-284/16 Slowakische Republik v Achmea BV (2018) CJEU <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62016CJ0284> accessed 3 December 2024.
[3] Hereinafter will be referred as “BITs”.
[4] Hereinafter will be referred as “ECT”.
[5] See C-741/19 République de Moldavie v Komstroy LLC (2021) CJEU <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62019CJ0741> accessed 3 December 2024.
[6] Hereinafter will be referred as “ISDS”.
[7] Hereinafter will be referred as “MS”.
[8] For instance, see ARB/15/16 BayWa R.E. Renewable Energy GMBH and BayWa R.E. Assest Holding GMBH v Kingdom of Spain (2019) ICSID <https://www.italaw.com/cases/7698> accessed 4 December 2024.
[9] See 2016/135 Green Power Partners K/S and SCE Solar Don Benito APS v Kingdom of Spain (2022) SCC Arbitration <https://www.italaw.com/cases/9471> accessed 17 December 2024.
[10] Hereinafter will be referred as “CSFR”.
[11] Slowakische Republik v Achmea BV(n 2) para. 2, 6.
[12] Ibid para. 6, 7.
[13] Ibid. para. 7.
[14] Ibid para. 8.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid para. 9.
[17] Ibid para. 10.
[18] Ibid para. 11.
[19] Ibid para. 12.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Hereinafter will be referred as “TFEU”.
[23] Slowakische Republik v Achmea BV(n 2) para. 14.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid para. 23.
[26] Ibid para. 31.
[27] Hereinafter will be referred as “ECHR”.
[28] Slowakische Republik v Achmea BV(n 2) para. 32.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid para. 40.
[31] Ibid para. 42.
[32] Ibid para. 43.
[33] C‑377/13 Ascendi Beiras Litoral e Alta, Auto Estradas das Beiras Litoral e Alta SA v Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira (2014) CJEU <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62013CJ0377> accessed 4 December 2024.
[34] Slowakische Republik v Achmea BV(n 2) para. 44.
[35] Ibid para. 45, 49.
[36] Ibid para. 58.
[37] Ibid para. 59.
[38] Ibid para. 60.
[39] Ibid para. 61.
[40] Hereinafter will be referred as “AG”.
[41] C-284/16 Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet (2017) CJEU para. 85 <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62016CC0284> accessed 12 December 2024.
[42] Ibid para. 86.
[43] Ibid para. 87.
[44] Ibid.
[45] See 109/88 Handels- og Kontorfunktionærernes Forbund I Danmark v Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening, acting on behalf of Danfoss (1989) CJEU <https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-109/88> accessed 14 December 2024.
[46] Ascendi Beiras Litoral e Alta, Auto Estradas das Beiras Litoral e Alta SA v Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira (n 33).
[47] C-555/13 Merck Canada Inc. v Accord Healthcare Ltd, Alter SA, Labochem Ltd, Synthon BV, Ranbaxy Portugal (2014) CJEU <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62013CB0555> 14 December 2024.
[48] Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet(n 41) para. 133.
[49] Ibid para. 136.
[50] C-459/03 Commission of the European Communities v Ireland (2006) <https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=c-459/03> accessed 15 December 2024.
[51] Opinion 2/13 (2014) CJEU <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62013CV0002> accessed 15 December 2024.
[52] Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet(n 41)para. 167, 168.
[53] Ibid para. 175.
[54] ARB/97/7 Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain (2000) ICSID <https://www.italaw.com/cases/641> accessed 15 December 2024.
[55] Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet(n 41) para. 175, footnote 129.
[56] Ibid para. 180.
[57] Ibid para. 183.
[58] Ibid para. 199-209.
[59] Ibid para. 210.
[60] Ibid para. 237.
[61] Ibid para. 238.
[62] Ibid para. 248.
[63] Ibid para. 255.
[64] Ibid para. 256.
[65] Ibid para. 273.
[66] See Opinion 2/15 (2017) CJEU <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:62015CV 0002(01)> accessed 16 December 2024.
[67] Maria Fanou, ‘Intra-European Union Investor-State Arbitration Post-Achmea: RIP?’ (2019) 26 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 316, 339.
[68] Ibid.
[69] Agreement for the termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties between the Member States of the European Union (EUR-Lex 29 May 2020) <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/agree_eums/2020/529/oj/eng> accessed 16 December 2024. Hereinafter will be referred as the “Termination Agreement”.
[70] Johannes Tropper and August Reinisch, ‘The 2020 Termination Agreement of Intra-EU BITs and Its Effect on Investment Arbitration in the EU: A Public International Law analysis of the termination agreement’ (2022) Austrian Yearbook of International Arbitration 301, 336-337.
[71] See BayWa R.E. Renewable Energy GMBH and BayWa R.E. Assest Holding GMBH v Kingdom of Spain (n 8).
[72] Maria Fanou, ‘Green Power Partners v Spain: Upholding the Intra-EU Objection to Jurisdiction in the ECT Context—A Swerve in the Search for the Line of Two Planes’ (2023) 38 ICSID Review 508, 509.
[73] See European Parliament, ‘Joint Motion for a Resolution on the outcome of the modernisation of the Energy Charter Treaty’ (European Parliament 23 November 2022) para. 19 <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/RC-9-2022-0498_EN.html> accessed 27 February 2025.
[74] International Energy Charter, ‘The Energy Charter Conference Adopts Decisions on the Modernisation of the Energy Charter Treaty’ (International Energy Charter 3 December 2024) <https://www.energycharter.org/media/news/article/the-energy-charter-conference-adopts-decisions-on-the-modernisation-of-the-energy-charter-treaty> accessed 17 December 2024.
[75] Council of the EU, ‘Energy Charter Treaty: EU notifies its withdrawal’ (Council of the EU 27 June 2024) <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/06/27/energy-charter-treaty-eu-notifies-its-withdrawal/> accessed 17 December 2024.
[76] Decision of the Energy Charter Conference (International Energy Charter 24 June 2022) <https://www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/CCDECS/2022/CCDEC202210.pdf> accessed 17 December 2024.
[77] See European Parliament (n 73).
[78] European Commission, ‘EU notifies exit from Energy Charter Treaty and puts an end to intra-EU arbitration proceedings’ (European Commission, 28 June 2024) <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_3513> accessed 19 December 2024.
[79] Ibid.
[80] Directorate-General for Energy, ‘Declaration on the legal consequences of the judgment of the Court of Justice in Komstroy and common understanding on the non-applicability of Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty as a basis for intra-EU arbitration’ (European Commission, 28 June 2024) <https://energy.ec.europa.eu/publications/declaration-legal-consequences-judgment-court-justice-komstroy-and-common-understanding-non_en> accessed 27 February 2025.
[81] For the details see European Commission, ‘Multilateral Investment Court project – Relevant documents’ (European Commission) <https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/enforcement-and-protection/multilateral-investment-court-project/relevant-documents_en> accessed 18 December 2024.
[82] Hereinafter will be referred as “CETA”.
[83] See Opinion 1/17 (2019) CJEU <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:62017CV 0001(02)> accessed 18 December 2024.
